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Welcome to the Histories
The HISTORIES. Vol. 2. No. 1___________________________
Welcome again to another issue of the Histories! For those of you who are 
unfamiliar with this journal, the Histories is an organization that is dedicated to 
educating all Lasallians about historical topics through scholarly historical research 
articles and photographs. It is our hope that we can deliver to you the same 
quality product that we did last year.
As with all student journals, an evolution in format and content is inevitable. 
In terms of this year’s format, this issue hopes to take on a sleeker look, one that 
will hopefully be pleasing to the superficial eye as well as to the deeply intuitive 
thoughts of the mind. Likewise, our issue is comprised of a vast array of historical 
subjects. The Histories intends to cover social, military, religious, and political 
topics in this issue.
Lastly, I would like to thank all those individuals who have contributed to 
the Histories in a number of ways. I would like to thank our History Department for 
its support of this magazine. Without their encouragement, the Histories would cease 
to be. I would also like to thank our writers for their contributions. Also, I greatly 
appreciated the advice and financial assistance given to me by Chris Kazmierczak. 
Finally, I want to thank the La Salle community for accepting this journal as its own. 
As a senior, I now understand what it means to leave a Lasallian legacy. I can only 
hope that the future of this magazine will be as bright as its past.
Editor-in-chief 
Matthew Joseph Smalarz
WRITERS: Tony Giammarco, Kristen Hess, Matthew Kowalski, Matthew 
Smalarz
MODERATORS: Dr. Charles Desnoyers, Dr. Stuart Leibiger, Prof. 
Jeffrey LaMonica
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Fleming vs. Florey: It A ll Comes Down to the M old 
Kristen Hess
Without penicillin, the world as it is known today would not exist. Simple 
infections, earaches, menial operations, and diseases, like syphilis and pneumonia, 
would possibly all end fatally, shortening the life expectancy of the population, 
affecting everything from family-size and marriage to retirement plans and insurance 
policies. So how did this “wonder drug” come into existence and who is behind the 
development of penicillin? The majority of the population has heard the “Eureka!” 
story of Alexander Fleming and his famous petri dish with the unusual mold growth, 
Penicillium notatum. Very few realize that there are not only different variations 
of the Fleming discovery but that there are also other people who were vitally 
important to the development of penicillin as an effective drug. This paper will 
focus on the discovery of penicillin by Alexander Fleming and the subsequent 
controversy that entails over the ‘Fleming Myth.’
Coming from a large farming family, Alexander Fleming has ample 
chances to discover nature in its purest form and to develop a keen interest in 
science. His decision to go to medical school and become a bacteriologist led him 
to St. Mary’s Medical School, London University. After graduation, he served in 
the Royal Army Corp before returning to St. Mary’s to teach and do further 
experimentation. (Rowland, The Penicillin Man) While doing experiments 
using Staphyloccus bacteria, Fleming discovered lysozyme, an enzyme within the 
human body capable of fighting infections and destroying certain bacteria. This 
discovery was purely coincidental when he supposedly sneezed on a plate of 
bacteria and some of his mucous landed on the plate killing the bacteria around it. 
This observation proved important in analyzing the body’s defense mechanisms.
He furthered his lysozyme work, which grew out of his interest in showing the 
ineffectiveness of chemical antiseptics to treat infection. Fleming believed it was 
more important to enhance the body’s own natural immune responses to treat 
disease. (Friedman, 168-181) It is also at St. Mary’s, in 1928, where Fleming 
discovered the saving mold.
Two accounts exist pertaining to the actual discovery of the mold. Both 
focus on Fleming’s untidy work habits and lack of sterile working conditions.
Some sources suggest that the dedication and work ethic of Alexander Fleming 
drove him to go work one day even though he was covered in boils. At lunchtime, 
Fleming supposedly found a moldy sandwich, and having nothing else, he ate it 
and found his boils were cured shortly thereafter. Using this as a basis, Fleming 
began experimentation using the mold in hopes of discovering what led to his 
recovery. This has only been quoted a few times and seems to be the least reliable
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of the two recollections.
More sources recall that on the day before he went on a two-week vacation, 
Fleming prepared petri dishes of bacteria cultures he wanted to grow over the break. 
Unbeknownst to him, a Penicillium notatum spore from a laboratory on the next floor 
landed on one of the plates. [The laboratory upstairs did not have a working hood 
over the lab bench, and the scientist was therefore forced to work under sloppy 
conditions, with the spores able to freely move about based on air circulation.] 
Because the vacation was two weeks long, Fleming noted he did not have to put the 
plates in the incubator to speed the growth; the time period would be such that the 
bacteria would flourish on their own. This was a fortunate occurrence because the 
penicillium spore would have died in the incubator and would not have been 
detected. Upon returning to the lab, Fleming found his Staphloccus bacteria had 
grown very well on all the petri dishes but one. One had a fuzzy greenish mold 
growing in it and the area around the mold was void of bacteria.
The discovery of the green mold surrounded by the yellow halo void of 
bacteria is often described as the “Eureka!” moment of Fleming’s career. When 
asked about what he thought about that special moment, he said, “My only merit 
is that I did not neglect the observation and that 1 pursued the subject as a 
bacteriologist.” (Ho, 117-123) This stems from the fact that the ability of 
Penicillium notatum to kill bacteria had been noted by two other scientists: John 
Tyndall in 1875 and D.A. Gratia in 1925. Both scientists found the observation 
intriguing but did not follow it up with any further experimentation; believing 
simply that the substance would be of interest only to fellow scientists and not to 
the rest of the world. Fleming, however, decided to experiment with the mold and 
found out what other bacteria it would affect. He found that the Penicillium 
notatum killed streptococcus, staphylococcus, pneunococcus, gonococcus, 
meningococcus, and diphtheria bacteria. This information led Fleming to believe 
the penicillin had potential as a local antiseptic in order to treat wounds and 
concentrated diseases.
Alexander Fleming: The Man responsible for discovering Penicillin
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Fleming had two assistants who helped him with the penicillin 
experiments: Frederick Ridley and Stuart Craddock. These two were in charge 
of finding more of the properties of the mold, doing toxicity tests, and using the 
mold grown in broth to put on local wounds. Fleming did titrations, a procedure 
used in determining acidic and basic properties of a substance, with their 
experimental results and then decided to inject some of the broth into living 
animals - a rabbit and a mouse. In using live animals he made an error - he did 
not use animals that were infected with a bacteria; rather he used healthy 
animals just to see if any penicillin would have any effect on their biological 
systems. He noted that in the presence of blood and serum the Penicillium 
notatum lost a large percentage of its activity; consequently, Fleming incorrectly 
assumed that penicillin would be unsuitable for use in a living organism. Had he 
injected it into an infected animal the potential of penicillin to kill bacteria could 
have been realized earlier; instead it was left untested at this point. Fleming did 
write an article about his findings to date and stated, “It has been used in a number 
of indolent septic wounds and has certainly appeared to be superior to dressings 
containing potent chemicals.” (MacFarlane, 139) In the summer of 1929, Fleming 
abandoned his research on penicillin because he was not a chemist and he was 
having difficulty isolating and identifying the active component involved.
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Ernst Boris Chain Sir Howard Walter Florey
It was now in the overall scheme of things, that other people became 
intimately involved in experimenting with penicillin and from this controversy 
inevitably arose. Howard Walter Florey took over as the Chair of the Pathology 
Department at Oxford University. He was looking for a project to revitalize the 
program and he stumbled across the work of Alexander Fleming. Florey felt 
lysozyme appeared to hold medicinal importance, seeing as it had once 
demonstrated the ability to destroy bacteria and that it existed in multiple bodily 
fluids. Florey got right to work on more experiments with lysozyme and hired
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Ernst Boris Chain to help him with the chemistry aspects of the experiments.
While doing research for the project, Chain found Fleming’s paper on the 
possibilities of penicillin and the two scientists decided to take on that project 
instead. Fleming did not publish all the information about the random 
experiments he had his assistants do with penicillin, leaving Chain and Florey 
with little to go on. The two men had no alternative but to test and learn 
by trial and error. Chain was responsible for purifying and identifying the 
active principle of penicillin and toiled numerous hours doing so. There were 
other members of the Oxford team who also participated' N. G. Heatley 
(production work), A. G. Sanders (pathologist), A. D. Gardener (bactericidal 
work) as well as some lab hands. This was an incredibly large investment both 
in time and energy for a Chair (Florey) to put into a project - had it failed 
miserably the consequences, undoubtedly, would have been dire.
The team isolated penicillin in 1939 and began proving its safety and 
efficacy. Florey had always been a big promoter of simply doing the experiment 
instead of wasting time hypothesizing. Fie promptly set up a trial involving eight 
mice - all infected with bacteria. Four of the mice were given doses of penicillin 
and four were left alone as control mice. The four treated mice lived and the 
other four lasted a few days before dying. Before allowing themselves to get 
excited, the two researchers did the experiment over - this time with ten mice 
and again the five treated mice lived and the five control mice died. Based on 
these findings the team published an article in The Lancet entitled, “Penicillin 
a Chemotherapeutic Agent,” on August 24, 1940. After reading of the Oxford 
team’s article, Fleming decided to pay them a visit. When Chain found out 
Fleming was coming he supposedly said, “Fleming? Good God, I thought he was 
dead!” When Fleming showed up at the lab he said, “I’ve come to see what you’ve 
been doing with my old penicillin.” (Parshall, 58-63) It was these words that 
provoked a bit of controversy. Even though Fleming can be credited with 
discovering the agent, the Oxford team felt that after all their hard work and 
difficulties, they too had rights to penicillin. No harsh words or ill feelings were 
exchanged at this meeting, however, and Fleming gladly walked the laboratory and 
took note of their experiments and latest findings.
The meeting with Fleming had no effect on the actions of the Oxford team; 
they continued to do experimentation and decided to take it a step further by actually 
seeing the effects of penicillin in a human being. Because they did not think it 
prudent to inject a healthy person in case of adverse side effects, they used a 
terminally ill patient who was supposed to die within two months and who agreed 
to it, Mrs. Akers. The effects penicillin had on her were not promising - she merely 
had a slight seizure. A second patient, Albert Alexander, who had developed a 
bacterial infection after getting a small scratch from a rosebush in his garden,
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normalized after being given penicillin but the supply ran out and he died soon 
after. Various other tests were done, leading the team to publish their second article 
in August 1941 in The Lancet - “Further Observations on Penicillin” which 
included details about techniques for developing cultures of the mold, extracting the 
active ingredient, purifying the penicillin and then testing it. The results were 
proving optimistic and Florey decided he needed financial aid to get penicillin 
production underway in hopes of aiding the war effort. Because the financial 
burden of World War II was less strenuous on the United States in the beginning 
of the war, U.S. labs were continuing experimentation and financial backers were 
willing to aid the research. Florey received the money from the Rockefeller Fund 
and began producing penicillin as fast as possible.
Meanwhile, Fleming, who for the most part had taken a spectator seat 
during all this experimentation and development of his “discovery,” decided things 
were looking up for his ‘old penicillin’ and therefore began to emphasize his rights 
on penicillin. The articles that came out about the new findings were responded 
to by a regurgitation of his original conclusion in regards to penicillin and its 
possible medicinal use, “suggested that it may be an efficient antiseptic for 
application to, or injection into, areas infected with penicillin-sensitive microbes.” 
(MacFarlane, 188) Fleming felt it necessary to make sure people remembered that 
he was the one who first realized the potential of penicillin. Slowly he was 
integrating himself back into the picture after his ten-year hiatus. When one of 
his close friends was taken ill, Fleming called on Florey and asked for a supply of 
penicillin for the patient. Florey answered and gave direction for dosage etc.
The patient was cured and Fleming was finally able to place confidence in his 
discovery. He then began supporting mass production of penicillin for medical 
purposes and the public caught wind of the story.
Publications began to appear with stories of the “wonder drug” and the 
amazing recoveries that happened because of it. When an article appeared without 
giving credit to any one person for penicillin, Sir Amroth Wright took action and 
wrote a letter into The Times stating that, “... it should be decreed to Professor 
Alexander Fleming of this research laboratory. For he is the discoverer of 
penicillin and was the author of the original suggestion that the substance 
may have medical importance.” In response, letters came in giving Florey credit 
saying, “...if the laurel wreath was to be given to Fleming then Florey deserved a 
bouquet at least, and a handsome one too.” (MacFarlane, 198) The press bombarded 
the two researchers; Fleming welcomed the attention and allowed pictures to be 
taken and stories ran. Flroey, on the other hand, was skeptical of publicity on his 
project and then was ruined when his experiment did not come out as expected. 
Florey may have also been hesitant because he was afraid the great publicity would 
create a demand for penicillin that could not possibly be met, seeing as production
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was slow and tedious. The reporters had to report on the information that they 
were given and it was Alexander Fleming that welcomed them with open arms. 
(Goldworthy, 176-178) It is with this that the Fleming story erupted.
Alexander Fleming had not been an active participant in the quest for 
medicinal penicillin for ten years and all of sudden he found himself in the middle 
of a media swarm. There was a constant demand for Fleming to appear in public - 
both to receive awards, present awards, give inspirational speeches, and talk of 
his discovery of penicillin. The favorite way the media liked to portray him 
was a hero figure. The ‘hero’ figure is a result of the exaggeration by the media 
not only of Fleming’s original discovery but also of the subsequent years when 
he literally stopped work on penicillin. Pictures of the original plate of bacteria 
with the mold growth on it circulated. Publicity began hitting the press about 
how Fleming was simply brimming with anticipation during the years he was 
not working on penicillin, waiting for the world to accept his findings and 
realize his genius. As is the case with journalism, the world saw the headlines 
and read the stories and attached onto Fleming as a brilliant scientist, making 
his name synonymous with penicillin. Every patient that received penicillin was 
quoted as saying, “Thank you Alexander Fleming!”
At first Fleming laughed at all the publicity. He clipped the newspaper 
articles and pictures and continued about his work trying not to draw so much 
attention to himself. Any time it was appropriate, Fleming mentioned the 
contributions of Florey and the Oxford team. He stated, “... although my work 
started you [Florey] off on the penicillin hunt, it was you who made a practical 
proposition and it is good that you get the credit.” The two men mutually 
exchanged thanks and appreciative letters. Soon enough though, Fleming found 
himself overwhelmed with social obligations - he constantly was being awarded 
honorary degrees and giving lectures. There was little time left for his actual work. 
The continuous adoration of Fleming by the public began to gnaw at the nerves of 
Florey, who managed to hold his tongue but was generally aggravated by the 
situation. The closest he came to publicly downplaying Fleming’s discovery was 
when he was quoted as saying, “In 1940, the first observations on penicillin were 
published...up to this time the real nature of penicillin has escaped detection.” 
(Parshall, 58-63) All the members of the Oxford team felt slighted at the lack of 
recognition being given to them. Chain was especially upset because he had urged 
Florey to get a patent on penicillin and Florey had felt it would not be fair to 
monopolize a scientific discovery - exactly what was happening with Fleming. 
[John Sheehan of a United States institution was the first to synthesize penicillin 
and; consequently obtained a patent for penicillin in 1957.] The glorified hero 
story of Fleming’s discovery was taking all the limelight.
People could not believe how unselfish and altruistic Fleming was - he
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had not even made money off of his discovery and yet people’s lives were being 
saved! Donations began flowing into the newspaper publishers and people 
willingly gave money to support awards to Fleming. It was easier for people to 
comprehend the deductive insight of a single individual than the technical feats 
of a team of scientists. (MacFarlane, 198) Florey had always placed strong 
emphasis on the teamwork factor involved in the experimentation and discovery. 
This attitude was not as understood by the general public who appreciated the 
idea of one lone genius. Florey’s desire for privacy allowed Fleming to take 
center stage.
In the midst of all the publicity, it appeared that Alexander Fleming was 
taking more credit for more than he was due or at least that he was not actively 
trying to set the story straight. Was he a conniving man that longed for attention 
that he felt he would never get otherwise? Or was he just human and enjoying 
the fame bestowed on him by the public, although inwardly realizing the depth 
of his contribution vs. the contributions of the Oxford team? Those closest to 
Fleming felt he was a man of good character that honestly did not realize that 
there was any slight being committed. Everyone who knew him generally spoke 
of him highly - not only for his scientific insight but also for his social skills in 
games and after dinner drinks. He was described as easy-going, modest, 
uncritical, and gregarious. His meek mannerism and far-from commanding 
presence left one liking Fleming right from the start. When awarded the Nobel 
Prize in 1945 along with Florey and Chain, he disclosed to one friend that he 
felt he might not deserve such esteem. Fleming admitted, however, that he 
enjoyed the publicity and was excited at the momentum from the public over 
his discovery. The source reiterated that one could not help but see how sincere 
Fleming was in these comments.
Meanwhile, the Oxford team believed the publicity was all contrived and 
that behind it was a dishonest campaign trying to credit Fleming and therefore get 
financial aid to St. Mary’s. They felt their anger was justified mainly by the fact that 
Fleming was not awarded the Nobel Prize when he first discovered penicillin but 
was only awarded it after the Oxford team had proved its importance and developed 
penicillin into a practical substance. Fortunately, Chain and Florey were co­
recipients of the Nobel Prize in regards to penicillin but it was difficult for them 
to fathom why Fleming was basking in glory. Fleming’s main contribution was 
simply observing the original mold. He had little inkling that the mold could be 
as medicinally important as it turned out to be. It had taken a team of scientists 
to turn the discovery into something really worth being excited about and the 
least amount of credit was going to them.
There is no evidence that Alexander Fleming purposely took credit for 
anything that he did not do. Numerous quotes suggest he insisted that he ‘didn’t
The Histories. VoL 2, No. 1 Page 10
make penicillin...nature made it, he just discovered it.’ The ambiguity found 
when researching this topic suggests the publicity was simply media driven and 
Fleming, not knowing how to handle the situation, decided to go with it. This 
circumstance where one scientist develops another’s discovery, bringing it to 
full potential, is a difficult one because the line for credit becomes blurred and 
it becomes dependent on the public to decide based on the information provided. 
Perhaps in the end the constant fame and publicity given to Fleming gave Florey 
the opportunity to focus on developing penicillin and was therefore a good thing. 
Because Fleming is enshrined in encyclopedias and books everywhere as the 
‘penicillin man’ and the ‘good doctor Fleming,’ it is unlikely public knowledge 
will be enhanced much beyond that. The scientific and medicinal circles will 
always have the opportunity to debate this issue but as always it will forever come 
down to the mold.
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The Battle o f  Germantown:
A Forgotten Fight for Philadelphia and Freedom  
Tony Giammarco
Throughout the past three years, my teammates and I have crossed streets 
and fields that have bore witness and stood as seldom noticed monuments to an 
event that has helped to define our nation’s momentous past. As a member of the 
LaSalle University Cross-Country Team, our daily routine, a brisk nine-mile run, 
takes us through the heart of historic Germantown. Turning left from Belfield 
Avenue, we begin our ascent up Church Lane. Reaching its summit, we then make 
a right onto the cobblestones of Germantown Avenue. After another quick left, we 
find ourselves on Schoolhouse Lane and on our way to the wooded trails of Valley 
Green. On the way to our final destination, we cross streets named Greene, Wayne, 
and Cliveden. Although my teammates and I have made this trek countless times,
I wonder if any of them realize the historical significance of their surroundings. Do 
any of them take into consideration the great sacrifices made by many men their age 
upon the streets that they now shuffle along? Unfortunately, I fear the answer to this 
question is no.
The Germantown of today looks little like it did during the late 18th century. 
Now expanding on both sides of Germantown Avenue for miles, the once small 
village has grown to a small city within a city. Choked with buses and strangled with 
decrepit row homes, the image of Washington and Howe’s Germantown, with its 
stately stone mansions, rich farmland, and vast orchards, has been lost forever.
More importantly, and perhaps more disturbing, the very events that took place in 
Germantown, which helped to shape the outcome of the American Revolution, 
might very well be lost as well, hidden under the trash and blocked from view by 
the burnt our buildings that cover modern day Germantown.
Although there are few plaques or statues commemorating the events of 
October 4, 1777, the blood spilt by American patriots on the streets and fields of 
Germantown is no less significant than that of more heralded places like Bunker 
Hill or Yorktown. In the early morning hours of October 4, over 200 years ago, 
American forces, of both the Continental army and militia, valiantly attacked 
encamped British and Hessian troops. For hours, the American forces struggled 
against the early morning darkness, fog, and unfamiliar terrain in a courageous 
attempt to dislodge the British and Hessian troops stationed at Germantown. 
Ultimately, the outcome of the battle was unfavorable for the Americans. However, 
even in defeat, the brash and tireless American forces displayed to the world 
that their farmer led uprising was for real.
Outnumbered and poorly equipped, the American army could have never
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defeated the British without foreign assistance. The Battle of Germantown, along 
with the American victory at Saratoga, secured a Franco-American alliance that 
proved absolutely crucial for the success of the American Revolution. For this 
reason, the events leading up to and of the Battle of Germantown must be brought 
to light. History has proven to be unkind to the soldiers that fought and died at 
Germantown, little has been written in textbooks and even less has been discussed 
in schools across the country about the battle. Any individual that takes pride in 
the actions and sacrifices made by patriotic Americans throughout the centuries 
on days like October 19, 1781, July 4, 1863, or June 6, 1944, must be properly 
informed about the events of October 4, 1777.
By 1777, the Americans and British has tasted both victory and defeat. 
The Americans, under the generalship of George Washington, had been decimated 
at Brooklyn, but had also scored opportunistic victories at Princeton and Trenton. 
As for the British, after experiencing early troubles at Lexington and Concord, 
they had rallied to capture strategically important New York City. Prior to 
spending the winter of 1776-1777 in the comfort of New York City, the 
British had devised a plan that they believed would win the war. Their plan called 
for the isolation of various regions throughout the country. General Burgoyne, 
commanding the British army of the North, would march down from Canada in 
an attempt to capture Albany in order to isolate New England. While Burgoyne 
made his way towards Albany, the British Southern army, under General Howe, 
would attempt to secure Philadelphia. The British believed that if the capital was 
under occupation and New England isolated, the Americans would lose their will 
to fight and surrender. (Jackson, 3)
While the British prepared to implement what they believed to be their 
war ending campaign of 1777, Washington and his army spent the winter of 
1776-1777 in the less hospitable confines of Morristown, New Jersey, vigilantly 
watching the British forces in New York City. Sensing a British invasion 
sweeping down from Canada, General Gates and the Northern army prepared 
to meet Burgoyne in upstate New York. By June of 1777, Howe had not 
yet departed New York City for Philadelphia. Parliament, becoming increasingly 
weary of the American rebellion and its costs, desired a hasty conclusion to 
the conflict. Hoping to fulfill King George 111 and Parliament’s wishes, Howe 
finally set off for Philadelphia. (Jackson, 5)
As the British were boarding ships in Sandy Hook, New Jersey destined 
for the Chesapeake Bay area, Washington was already aware of their movement, 
but not their destination. He later received information that the British 256-ship 
flotilla, the largest ever assembled in America, was sailing south down the 
Atlantic coast. Maintaining the British within sight for most of their journey, 
Washington’s 11,000-man army humped their way from northern New Jersey to
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Wilmington, Delaware, approximately 20 miles south of Philadelphia. After several 
miserable weeks at sea, Howe and 17,000 British troops landed at Head of Elk, 
Maryland. In an attempt to save time lost at sea, Howe quickly organized his army 
for their march north towards Philadelphia. During all this excitement, a nervous 
Continental Congress, residing in Philadelphia, watched, waited, and listened while 
Washington scrambled to position his troops between Howe and the city. (Jackson, 7) 
For weeks after their landing, the British made their way north from 
Maryland towards Philadelphia. Small groups of militia confronted the British 
along their journey and only a few light skirmishes broke out. Easily sweeping past 
the bands of militia, the British continued their drive towards the American capital. 
However, on September 11, British and American forces clashed along the 
Brandywine Creek in Pennsylvania. The plan was to confront and defeat the 
British before they ever reached Philadelphia. Unfortunately, the Americans were 
unsuccessful in thwarting the British advance towards the city. After the engage­
ment, the British encamped on the battlefield as the Americans regrouped and 
fled for Chester, Pennsylvania. Finding little refuge in Chester and in no condition 
for another battle, Washington and his battered army crossed the Schuylkill River 
and marched along its east bank to the Falls of Schuylkill near Germantown. 
Guarding against a British surprise attack, General Wayne and a detachment of 
1500 troops remained on the west side of the Schuylkill. With Philadelphia’s 
comforting church steeples in sight and only a few miles down river, Washington’s 
troops begrudgingly followed Washington north along the river. (Gifford, 69) 
Washington ordered Wayne and his men to cut off the British baggage 
train and to harass the British rear guard. By September 20, Wayne, believing 
his position was undetected by the British, planned an attack for the next day. 
Unfortunately for Wayne and his troops, his position was given away by the 
smoke of their campfires and by Tory farmers. (Gifford, 75) British forces, 
under General Grey, stealthily approached the small group of unsuspecting 
American troops. General Grey ordered his men to use only swords and 
bayonets in an attempt not to give away their position with loud volleys of 
musket fire. The Americans were taken completely by surprise and suffered 
heavy losses. Although many troops were taken prisoner, the British use of 
the bayonet, which the Americans considered somewhat barbaric, led the public 
to perceive the incident as a massacre. (Gifford, 76)
Following what came to be known as the Paoli Massacre, the British 
were able to move virtually unmolested up and down the banks of the 
Schuylkill River. On September 26, British and Hessian forces paraded into 
Philadelphia. Writing in her diary, British Loyalist and Philadelphia resident,
Sarah Fisher remarked that she “rose very early this morning in hopes of seeing 
a most pleasing sigh t... First came the light horse, led among by Enoch Story and
The Histories, Vol. 2, No. 1 Page 14
Phineas Bond, as the soldiers were unacquainted with the town and the different 
streets, nearly 200 I imagine in number, clean dress and their bright swords 
glittering in the sun. After that came the foot, headed by Lord Cornwallis. Before 
him went a band of music, which played a solemn tune and which I afterward 
understood was called “God Save great George our King.” Then followed the 
soldiers, who looked very clean and healthy and a remarkable solidity was on 
their countenances, no wanton levity, or indecent mirth, but a gravity well 
becoming the occasion seemed on all their faces. After that came the artillery 
and then the Hessian grenadiers.” (Gifford, 85)
Meanwhile, Washington, after receiving several thousand reinforcements, 
moved his army from Schwenksville, Pennsylvania, down the Skippack Road and 
encamped sixteen miles from Germantown. Determined to attack the British army 
at Germantown, Washington called a Council of War on September 28. By a 
vote of ten to five, Washington’s council suggested that the army should move 
within twelve miles of Germantown to await more reinforcements. (Jackson, 29) 
Then, on October 2, Washington received very favorable information. He learned 
that Howe had sent 3000 men to Elkton in an attempt to gather supplies and 
another 3000 men were in Philadelphia under Cornwallis. In addition, the 10th 
and 42nd Regiment had been sent into New Jersey in order to capture a fort 
along the Delaware River. The council, upon receiving this information, 
decided that it was now time to attack Howe. (Gifford, 86)
Washington designed a plan that called for a four-pronged attack against 
Howe’s position in Germantown. Although impressive on paper, his plan 
was extremely complicated and a bit naive. Washington’s plan called for: “The 
Divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway’s Brigade, were to enter 
the Town by way of Chestnut Hill, while General Armstrong, with the 
Pennsylvania Militia should fall down the Manatawny Road by Vandeerings 
Mill and get upon the Enemy’s left and rear. The Divisions of Greene and 
Stephen, flanked by McDougal’s Brigade, were to enter by taking a circuit by 
way of the Lime Kiln Road at the Market House and to attack their Right 
wing, and the Militia of Maryland and Jersey under Generals Smallwood 
and Foreman were to march by the Old York road and fall upon the rear of 
their right. Lord Stirling with Nash and Maxwell’s Brigades was to form a 
Corps de Reserve. (Jackson, 31) In order for the plan to be successful, 
Washington’s four columns had to travel great distances in darkness and over 
unfamiliar territory, separated by miles, with no form of communication, and 
arrive at their destinations simultaneously within two miles of the British 
pickets. Due to the inexperience of the American troops and officers, 
successfully implementing this plan was virtually impossible. (Gifford, 87)
At seven o’clock in the evening on October 3, the American forces began to march
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along their various routes towards Germantown. For days prior to the battle, 
Washington has sent out mounted patrols to harass British outposts. Washington 
hoped that because of these mounted patrols, the appearance of American forces on 
October 3 would not create undue alarm within the British ranks. Unfortunately, 
before the first shots were even fired, the Americans suffered a huge setback. The 
Maryland and New Jersey militias, under Smallwood and Foreman, perhaps 
confused by the unfamiliar terrain, wandered aimlessly along Old York Road.
Their meandering cost so much time that their arrival at Germantown was too late 
to be a factor in the battle. (Jackson, 32)
Despite this setback, the Americans were able to capture the upper hand 
during the early stages of the battle. General Conway’s brigade was the first to 
engage the British at Mt. Airy. Their attack forced the British back, but not 
before their field guns alarmed the remainder of the British forces in Germantown. 
(Gifford, 88) After a brief British counterattack, Wayne’s division, eager to 
avenge the Paoli Massacre, began to cut down scores of British troops. The 
British began to retreat while Wayne’s men gave chase. Later, Wayne wrote:
“Our people, remembering the action of the night of the 20th of September, 
pushed on with their bayonets, and took ample vengeance for that night’s work. 
Our officers exerted themselves to save an many of the poor wretches, but to 
little purpose; the rage and fury of the soldiers were not to be restrained for some 
time, at least not until great numbers of the enemy fell by their bayonets.
(Gifford, 89)
As the frightened and confused British scampered back towards 
Germantown, Colonel Musgrave, along with 120 British troops barricaded 
themselves in Benjamin Chew’s country house, Cliveden. The events that 
followed proved to be the turning point of the battle. Musgrave and his men 
closed the heavy wooden shutters and gathered every available piece of 
furniture in front of the house's doorways. A few British troops were posted 
by the doorway on the first floor while the remainder of the men crouched 
below windows on the upper floors. After Musgrave delivered an 
impassioned speech, the British troops prepared to defend their “castle” 
against an impending American siege. (Gifford, 90)
Re-enactment of the battle of Germantown
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At this point during the battle, a heavy fog descended upon the 
low-lying village of Germantown and the surrounding area. Stumbling 
their way through the thick mixture of fog and smoke, General Sullivan’s 
division made their way past the virtual British fortress at Cliveden 
and began firing at every moving apparition that appeared or was believed 
to have appeared. Angered by this wasteful use of precious ammunition, 
Washington sent Timothy Pickering to settle down Sullivan and his men.
After meeting with Sullivan, Pickering made his way back to Washington and 
discovered Musgrave and his men inside the Chew house. Pickering delivered the 
information of his discovery to Washington and advised him to leave a small 
detachment behind to deal with Musgrave and his men. On the contrary, General 
Henry Knox told Washington “It would be unmilitary to leave a castle in our rear.” 
(Gifford, 91)
Despite Pickering’s pleas, Washington was persuaded by Knox.
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Smith of Virginia volunteered to deliver the summons 
of surrender to Musgrave. Unfortunately, while carrying a flag of truce, Smith 
was cut down by a British musket ball. Enraged, the Americans quickly 
surrounded Cliveden while Knox positioned artillery pieces directly in front of 
the house. A hail of musket balls and grape pounded Cliveden’s formidable 
stonewalls and blasted through its wooden shutters and doors. However, the 
British remained inside. While British blood splattered the interior walls and 
spilt on the floor, the blood of Americans painted the lawn surrounding the house 
a deep red. Whether attempting to enter the house or trying to light it on fire, 
courageous Americans were cut down by British troops raining fire down from 
Cliveden’s upper floors. (Gifford, 94)
Cliveden (Cliveden of the National Trust)
Washington’s decision to attempt to dislodge the British from Cliveden 
cost precious time and valuable American lives. Meanwhile, Sullivan and his 
men made their way towards the British center on the west side of Germantown
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Road (now Germantown Avenue) as Wayne and his men traveled down the 
eastside. Due to the heavy fog, both Sullivan and Wayne made their way past 
Cliveden without noticing the battle that raged around it. At the same time,
General Greene, along with two-thirds of the American army, had already 
reached the British center at Market House. (Gifford, 95) Unfortunately,
General Adam Stephen, who was reported to have been drunk at the time of 
the battle, diverted his force away from Greene’s right wing and started 
towards the noise coming from Cliveden. Amidst the thick fog, Stephen’s 
men encountered Wayne’s force and began to fire upon them, mistaking them 
for the British.
Believing to be under heavy enemy fire, Wayne’s division broke ranks 
and began to flee. Pushing their way forward, Sullivan’s men battled their way 
towards the British center to meet up with Greene. Unfortunately, Sullivan 
and his men ran out of ammunition and were forced to join Wayne in retreat.
Instead of chasing after the retreating Americans, the British decided to focus 
their attention on Greene. (Gifford, 96) Despite many setbacks, Greene and 
his men were fighting very well. If Sullivan and Wayne remained in the fight, 
the Americans would have been able to pin the British against the banks 
of the Schuylkill River. Instead, with Sullivan and Wayne being forced to 
retreat, the British were able to muster their full force against Greene. Hungry, 
tired, and short of ammunition, Greene and his men began a fighting retreat. (Gifford, 
97) Despite encouraging pleas from Washington, the inexperienced American 
forces were unable to reorganize for a counterattack. At this point, realizing defeat, 
Washington reluctantly sent out couriers to all commands ordering a general 
withdrawal. (Gifford, 101)
After the battle, the British remained in Germantown while the Americans 
retreated towards Schwenksville. The victorious British reported 4 officers and 66 
men killed, 30 officers, and 396 men wounded, and 1 officer and 13 men missing.
The defeated Americans reported 30 officers and 122 men killed, 117 officers 
and 404 men wounded, and approximately 400 missing. Although the British 
were victorious, the battle proved to be an ultimate success for the Americans.
News of the battle spread to Europe and more importantly France. The French, 
covertly supporting the Americans with supplies throughout the war, were now 
leaning towards openly supporting the weary Americans. (Jackson, 50)
By late 1777, the French had received news about both Germantown and 
Saratoga and they were very pleased with what they heard. French diplomats 
learned that in the north, General Gates had surrounded General Burgoyne 
and forced his surrender. They believed that this victory had raised American 
spirits throughout the continent and had disheartened the British. (Murphy, 58)
The French also believed that Washington scored a near victory at Germantown.
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French diplomats were told that if the smoke and fog had not created disorder 
amongst the American forces, the British would have been defeated. More 
important to the French, the Battle of Germantown demonstrated that the 
British attempt to crush the Americans during the campaign of 1777 was a 
failure in the northern as well as the central theaters of the war. The battle also 
displayed that the Americans would be a welcomed addition to the French 
who were preparing to make the Revolutionary War a world war. (Murphy, 64)
A young British officer, Wilfred Owen, once penned these poetic 
words shortly before his death in the First World War:
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace /
Behind the wagon that we flung him in, /
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, /
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; /
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood /
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, /
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud /
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues- /
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest /
To children ardent for some desperate glory, /
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est /
Pro patria mori. (Kennedy and Gioia, 41)
This old line that Owen refers to in Latin at the closing of his poem is “It is sweet 
and fitting to die for one’s country.” The Americans that fell and bled the ground 
red along the streets of Germantown believed in this ancient Latin axiom. They 
felt that the ultimate sacrifice they were laying before the altar of freedom would 
make their home a better place to live in for the one they loved. What they did not 
realize was the fact that their sacrifices would help to create a country that would 
become a beacon for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
October 4, 1777 was a huge milestone in the life of young America. 
Throughout the colonies, there was a belief that the revolution would be a success. 
Many Americans believed that they could fight toe to toe with the British, 
however, most of Europe did not. The Battle of Germantown changed the 
opinions of many Europeans and the Americans quickly garnered the respect and 
admiration of many foreign nations. If the events of October 4 had never taken 
place, the Americans might have found themselves fighting a war against a 
world power by themselves, hopelessly outnumbered and under supplied. 
Fortunately, the Battle of Germantown was fought and the heroic sacrifices made 
by many Americans on that day changed the course of the war and American 
history forever.
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Hitler's character and its impact on Operation Barbarossa 
Matthew Kowalski
On June 22,1941, Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossia, his invasion 
of the Soviet Union, which he looked upon as the fulfillment of his life’s mission.
When assessing the German invasion of the Soviet Union, most historians will point 
to the immense geographic and logistical disadvantages faced by the Germans as the 
main reasons for the campaign’s failure. This said, many of these disadvantages could 
have been nullified, if not for a series of blunders committed by Adolf Hitler during the 
opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. Almost every one of these strategic 
blunders were results of deeply rooted flaws in Hitler’s character. These major flaws 
were his inflated beliefs in his skills as a military tactician and his program of wagging 
a war of annihilation on racial and ideological terms. Both of these would prove to be 
disastrous in the key early months of the Russian campaign, when the German army 
could have defeated the Soviet Union before it could harness its advantages in 
manpower and greater industrial output. Rather Hitler’s flawed decision-making in 
this key opening stage of the invasion negated the potential for a quick victory which 
he needed and resulted in a long war of attrition that Germany simply had no hope of 
winning.
Before examining Hitler’s impact on the course on the Russian campaign, we 
must first explore what forged his character. The roots of the racial worldview that 
shaped his character, and indeed the invasion of Russia itself, can be found in his 
formative years and are summed up in his book Mein Kampf. This idea of seeking 
lebensraum {living space} at the expense of the Slavs, whom he considered 
untermench {sub-human}, was not an original one. This is made clear in this quote, 
“other Germans, other Europeans, had talked and written in racist terms before Hitler; 
but he alone set about translating ideology into action.”{Bullock 415}
This said, we must conclude that Hitler’s racism was inherited from the 
intellectual movements of the late 19th century, which he was first exposed to during 
his time in Vienna from 1908-13. Indeed, in Mein Kampf he clearly states the 
importance of this period of his life in his proclamation that, “during this time I 
formed the basic picture of the world and ideology which has become the granite 
foundation of my deeds.” {Hitler 50} The Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which Hitler 
was a product, was in a state of decay with its large non-German minorities 
clamoring for greater autonomy. For the zealous German nationalists of the day, the 
future survival of the Teutonic race lied in the colonization and exploitation of the 
lands to the east. To support their rhetoric, they looked toward the “scientific racism” 
implied in the philosophy of Social Darwinism. This perversion of Darwin’s theory of 
survival of the fittest, concluded that races like all other living things were engaged in 
a struggle against one another. As in Darwin, one race will prevail in this struggle
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because it is biologically superior. In the hands of proto-Nazis, like the racial 
theorists Adolf Lanz and the geopolitical scientist Karl Haushofer, this biologically 
superior race was applied to the Germanic peoples. All of this would have had a great 
impact on the impressionable young artist Adolf Hitler, who at the time was jobless 
and searching for meaning. The notion that there was a “hierarchy of races” would go 
far to help alleviate the young Hitler’s own personal sense of inferiority.
The impact of this racial worldview that Hitler had first absorbed in Vienna, 
and then expanded upon, would become apparent in his assessment and conduct of 
the war in Russia. One result of this deep-rooted facet of Hitler’s character was his 
fatal under-estimation of his Soviet adversary. In his book Operation Barbarossa. 
Bryan Fugate states that “ the narrow-minded Nazi prejudice about the Russian 
people were perhaps the single biggest problem to overcome.” {Fugate 75} In the eyes 
of Hitler, the Soviet Union was inherently weak due to the fact that “Bolshevism 
had robbed the Russian people of those Germanic organizers who had created the 
Russian state and replaced them with that ferment and of decomposition.” } Rich 210} 
This rabid racism, plus the poor performance of the Red Army in the Finnish 
campaign of 1939-40 and in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa, led Hitler 
to the conclusion that the war in the East would last five months at the most.
The truth of the matter was that the Red Army’s early setbacks, were due 
more to the disastrous effects of Stalin’s purges of his military leadership in the mid­
thirties, then to the actual quality of the Soviet fighting man. The Germans would 
soon learn that when led by competent officers, such as a Marshall Zhukov, the Red 
Army was just as effective a fighting force as the Wehrmacht. Also, the assertion 
that victory could be achieved in a relatively short period of time only served to 
blind Hitler to the reality of preparing for a possible winter campaign. On three 
separate occasions Field Marshall von Brauchitisch requested that winter clothing 
be issued to the troops. However, every time the matter was brought up, Hitler 
assured him that victory would be achieved before winter set in.
The other major blunder that came as a result of Hitler’s racism, was the 
failure of the Germans to utilize the dissatisfaction of significant portions of the 
Soviet population to harsh Stalinist rule to their own advantage. In his work How 
Hitler Could Have Won World War Two. Bevin Alexander is of opinion that of all 
of Hitler’s blunders, “his most disastrous error was to go into the Soviet Union as a 
conqueror, instead of a liberator.” } Alexander 81} In the early months of 
war in the East, many segments of the Soviet population saw the German invasion 
as a deliverance from the terror of the Stalin regime. This attitude was particularly 
prevalent in the areas that had only recently been brought under Soviet control 
under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. In the Baltic Republics and 
the western Ukraine, there existed strong separatist movements that the Germans 
could have used to their own ends. It is very conceivable that had Hitler sought to
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exploit these sentiments, “ the Bolshevik regime itself may have disintegrated, as the 
Tsarist armies had in l917.” {Shirer 939} Some have even gone so far as to estimate 
that a “German policy of liberation would have been enough to assure a complete 
German victory in 1914 or 1942.” {Dupuy 95}
All this said, however, Hitler’s conviction that the Slavs were an inferior 
people, compromised what could have been one of the best opportunities the 
Germans had in defeating the Soviet Union in a quick campaign. Hitler saw the war 
against Russia as the fulfillment of his dream for the attainment of “lebensraum.”
As far as he was concerned the Slavic population would have to be systematically 
decreased, in order to make way for the future German settlement. Hitler’s Reich's 
Commissar for the Eastern Territories, Alfred Rossenberg, best sums up this policy 
by his quote, “we see no reason for any obligation on our part to feed the Russian 
people with the products of that surplus territory.” This policy of exploitation and 
repression automatically negated the positive impact of the strong anti-Stalin 
sentiments of many Soviet citizens, as it simply replaced one form of terror with 
another. The results of this policy in military terms was that what could have been a 
wide degree of active support on the part of the Russian population, instead became 
a greater desire to resist manifesting itself in the form of partisan warfare. A war was 
waged behind the lines that not only threatened the German’s over-extended lines of 
communication and supply, but also tied -down additional troops which where 
needed in the frontlines.
After dealing with the blunders attributed to Hitler’s racial views, we must 
now examine the elements of his character that influenced his military decision­
making. The first of these aspects which needs to be looked at is Hitler’s firm belief 
in his military genius. This inflated view of his skills was deeply rooted in the 
success of the Werhmacht’s previous campaigns, particularly in the west in the 
spring of 1940. His general staff, in planning the invasion of France, had been 
wrong in their assessment of where best to strike at the Allies. Their reworking of 
the old Schlieffen Plan lacked imagination, while the Manstein strategy adopted by 
Hitler, led to German victory in less then six weeks. As Bevin Alexander puts it,
“the adoption of the Manstein Plan by Hitler, was the best decision he ever made.” 
{Alexander 7} This and the slew of other successes, such as the move into the 
Rhineland in 1936, in which Hitler’s decisions proved correct as opposed to the 
assessments of his generals, had infused him with a sense of arrogance.
Hitler’s inflated opinion of his own military greatness may also have been 
a result of his experience in the First World War and his long held mistrust of the 
German military elite. As a frontline soldier in the trenches Hitler always had been 
under the impression that “he the humble veteran knew more about the conduct of 
war than the generals.”{Overy 274} After all, was it not these same members of the 
military elite who had during the course of Great War, questioned his leadership
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qualities? Their assessment of the then Lance corporal Hitler was that he was “too 
moody to ever rise to a position of leadership,” regardless of his impressive war 
record. It could be assumed that this feeling of being snubbed might have had a 
profound impact on Hitler’s future relationship with his generals. His domination of 
staff conferences and stifling of any independent thought but his own, may have been 
as Field Marshall von Ricnthofen put it, “sweet revenge for the ex-corporal.”
{Overy 277}
All this said, however, Hitler had practically no real experience at military 
leadership. His decision making was not based on any practical military thought 
process, but rather a combination of his belief in the ability of the German fighting 
man to overcome adversity and a habit of reckless gambling at the expense of an 
overall strategy. All of these facets of Hitler’s military thinking contributed in some 
way to the execution of the invasion of Russia. His belief in the “will” of the 
German fighting men, a result of his racial outlook, was to form the basis of Hitler’s 
policy of strategic withdrawals, which was simply that they were not allowed. The 
very thought of yielding ground to the enemy, even when it made more strategic 
sense to do so was absolutely repugnant to Hitler. It was his opinion that simply by 
their sheer courage the German soldier would somehow always win the day, even 
under intense pressure. The results of this “stand and die” defense were only the 
senseless waste of men and material. Hitler, however, failed to see the coastlines of 
this strategy. When approached by General Guderian about this problem he replied, 
“Do you think Frederick the Great’s grenadiers were anxious to die? They wanted to 
live too, but the king was right in asking them to sacrifice themselves. I too am 
entitled to ask any German soldier to lay down his life.” {Bullock 737}
Another of Hitler’s character traits that effected his ability to lead effectively 
was his inability to balance his role as both a military and political leader. Hitler, for 
all his political skill was never able to effectively fit into the model of an effective 
wartime commander and chief. Rather then laying out an overall strategy and leaving 
the military details up to the professionals, in the fashion of a Roosevelt or Churchill, 
Hitler was obsessed with the most minute details of waging war. Regularly at 
conferences “Hitler interfered with the smallest details of battle; regiments and air 
squadrons were moved on the instructions of the Supreme Commander.” {Overy 277} 
The results of this meddling was that, “instead of an overall strategy Hitler 
substituted a jumble of individual decisions and orders.” {Overy 277}
Finally, the two character traits that had the greatest impact on Hitler’s 
execution of the war in Russia, was his habit of opportunistic gambling. From the 
very beginnings of his career, Hitler had showed himself to be both a gambler and 
an opportunist. From the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the invasion of France, he 
had always been willing to seize an opportunity if he felt it would fulfill his aims. 
Hitler’s opportunistic nature is best summed up in the statement that, “ once
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embroiled in a camp, he was ready to toss away even his general goal to seize an 
opportunity that appeared.’’{Alexander 98} So far, this policy of reckless gambling 
had resulted in nothing but success. In the war in the East, however, Hitler’s 
persistent opportunism most likely compromised Germany’s best chance of 
achieving victory in a quick campaign.
Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa on paper
During the operational planning of invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler’s 
generals were of the opinion that Moscow was to be the campaign’s overall goal. This 
strategy made logical military sense, due to the centralized nature of the Stalin 
regime. Moscow was for all intensive purposes the nerve center of the entire Soviet 
Empire. It was from this epicenter of the Soviet Union, where all governmental policy 
was formulated and then distributed. The fall of Moscow would then mean, “if not 
the complete crumbling of the entire Union, at least the paralysis of her effective 
resistance, owing to the chaos in communication and administrative life.” {Anders 
23} This said Hitler, who never appreciated the strategic importance of the Soviet 
capital to begin with, delayed the drive on Moscow by recklessly committing 
divisions to other sectors of the front.
The prime example of this was his decision to move the bulk of Army 
Group B’s panzers to the Ukraine, which were rapidly advancing towards Moscow, 
for the assault on Kiev in late August. This move has been classified as being, “one 
of the greatest examples in history of how a leader can be reduced by a vision of 
short term gain into abandoning a course of action that would have given him 
victory.” {Alexander 98} His reasoning for this sudden change in strategy was not 
the product of sound military judgment, although there was a large concentration
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of Red Army units were defending the city, but rather pure opportunism. Hitler simply 
just could not resist the temptation of possibly encircling an entire Soviet army group. 
Indeed, the number of prisoners taken following the German victory at Kiev was 
staggering, numbering some 665,000 men.
Hitler’s Panzer Divisions
This said, however, it delayed the drive on Moscow, which was by far the 
more important strategic objective. By the time Hitler ordered the resumption of the 
drive on Moscow, on September 30lh, he had given the Soviets time to prepare an 
ample defense for the city. The assault on Kiev also wasted precious men and 
material that would have been better used in the assault on Moscow, at a time when 
the German supply lines were becoming increasingly overextended. Although by 
far the most serious consequence of Hitler’s decision to delay the drive on Moscow, 
this meant that German troops would run the risk of failing to capture the city 
before the onset of winter. This unanticipated eventuality was why the German army 
had to stop its advance in December, within sight of the Kremlin. The German 
assault on Moscow, code named Operation Typhoon, was first slowed by muddy roads 
in October and then finally ground to a halt by the snow and subzero temperatures of 
the Russian winter.
Russia’s greatest ally during Hitler’s Invasion: The Winter
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The brunt of the blame for the failure to capture Moscow, and conceivably 
ending the war on the Eastern Front, squarely rests on the shoulders of Adolf Hitler.
It was his decision to halt the drive on the Soviet capital and gamble at Kiev that 
doomed the prospects of Germany achieving victory in 1941. Bevin Alexander’s 
comment that, “at Kiev Germany won a great local victory, but surrendered its last 
chance to the win the war” {Alexander 99}, best sums up this fatal blunder. The 
missed opportunity to capture Moscow before winter meant simply that Germany was 
now faced with a longer war in the East, which it could not win. The massive 
advantages in manpower and industrial production possessed by the Soviets would 
eventually overpower the Third Reich.
In conclusion, the defeat of Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front was due to 
several factors. The operation itself was an immense gamble to begin with, 
considering the immense advantages the USSR possessed in size, population, and 
industrial capability. This said the ability of the German armed forces to achieve 
victory was severely compromised by decisions made by Hitler during the early 
stages of the campaign. These blunders, among them the failure to exploit the 
disenchantment of the Russian population with the Stalin regime and the costly 
delay to press on to Moscow, were all direct results of flaws within Hitler’s own 
character. Had Hitler not pursued his brutal racial policy toward the Slavs and 
left the actual waging of the war to the military professionals, he may have 
achieved his aim of a quick victory. Instead, he found himself embroiled in a 
prolonged conflict in which Germany simply could not win. Antoine Henri 
Jomini may have put it best when he observed, “Russia is a country that is 
easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of.”
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Pius XII and the Holocaust Under His Very Windows 
Matthew Smalarz
The Holocaust was one of the worst atrocities committed in all of human 
history. Nazi propaganda was devoted to the destruction of Jewish communities and 
culture during the 1930s and 40s. In January 1942, Hitler began his Final Solution 
with every intention of wiping out every last remnant of Jewish life. From that 
point on, the Nazis systematically murdered six million of the Jewish faith. While this 
occurred, Pope Pius XII waited out the war in the Vatican. As Jews were butchered 
in concentration camps, the Pope failed to intercede on their behalf. This is the 
problem addressed in this paper. Did Pius XII attempt to save the Jewish population 
in Europe or were his inactions responsible for the murders of six million Jews? The 
purpose of this paper is to show Pius XII 's unwillingness to speak out against the 
Holocaust. By failing to condemn the ongoing killings, Pius XII aided Nazi 
Germany in its plan to extinguish European Jewry. In the final analysis, this paper 
hopes to give an honest interpretation of the hidden truth of Pius XII 's 
irresponsibility and anti-Semitic tendencies during the Holocaust.
For the first three years of World War II, the Final Solution was an idea Nazi 
Germany was planning in secret. On January 3, 1939, Hitler delivered an address 
about the Final Solution, an idea that would take two years to implement.
By June 1941, Reinhold Heydrich was asked to prepare for the Final Solution. In 
other words, Hitler intended to arrest all European Jews and then send them off to 
concentration camps. On January 20, 1942, the proposal was officially adopted and 
by March the deportations began. This was the beginning of the end for six million 
innocent Jews. (Mclnemy, 74)
During this time of human suffering, many turned to religion to cope with the 
killing. The one person many Catholics turned to for answers about the extermination 
of the Jews was Pope Pius XII. During 1942, Pius XII received a constant flow of 
information concerning the Jewish deportations. The world anxiously awaited a 
statement of condemnation from the Pope concerning the European Jews. Instead,
Pius remained silent. (Goldhagen, 24) To say that all Catholics were anti-Semitic, 
however, is an incorrect statement. For example, Pius XII 's papal nuncio to 
Germany, Orsenigo, tried desperately to prevent further deportations. (Mclnerny, 74) 
Yet the Pontiff was indifferent to the demands made by world leaders to issue a 
condemnation. It was believed only diplomatic pressure from the British and United 
States would force the Pope to open up. Francis D’Arcy Osborne, the British 
Foreign Officer in the Vatican, attempted repeatedly, without success, to get Pius to 
speak out. (Cromwell, 281) Osborne noted the British public’s aggravation at Pius 
XII’s reluctance to condemn the Holocaust. (Cromwell, 282) Likewise, Osborne’s 
counterpart, Harold Tittman, the American envoy from the United States, tried
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repeatedly to get Pius to formally condemn the atrocities, but with no success. In both 
men’s conversations with one another, Osborne and Tittman complained that Pius XII 
was staying quiet because he either wanted the Axis to win or he was too afraid to 
speak out on secular matters. (Cromwell, 283)
As the diplomatic pressure continued, news reports began to filter in about 
the mass slaughtering of Jews. For example, on July 17, 1942, Apostolic Visitor 
Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone informed the Vatican that 2 million Jews had already 
been exterminated. (Zuccoti, 102) Reports were also being consistently filed 
from Hungary, Switzerland, and Slovakia that Jews were being rounded up and 
then sent off to the camps. (Phayer, 48)ln the Summer of 1942, hundreds of thousands 
of Jews were deported from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. On August 7, the 
papal nuncio to Vichy, Valerio Valeri, sent a report to the Vatican that Jews were 
being carried away on trains to Poland and the Ukraine. (Zuccotti, 103) In September 
1942, Myron C. Taylor, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s special envoy to the Vatican, was 
asked to deliver an important communique to the Pope regarding the fate of 
European Jews. (Zuccotti, 104) There were two important proposals within this 
message. First, the United States wanted to delay the Pope’s inclinations towards a 
peace proposal with the Axis powers. (Cromwell, 289) Secondly, and most 
importantly, was the Pope’s formal denunciation of the mass deportations and 
killings of European Jews. Given the information the Vatican received, the 
pressure to declare the killings morally unjust overwhelmed Pius XII. If Pius had 
been more forthcoming, chances are the Allies’ reports about the Jewish 
deportations may have been taken more seriously. (Cromwell, 286) Rather,
Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State for the Vatican, stated his belief that,
“it has not been possible to verily the accuracy” of these sources. (Phayer, 48) 
However, Pius XII decided to make a half-hearted effort by saying, “no year has 
passed that We have not appealed in Our public utterances to all the belligerents ... 
to show some feeling of pity and charity for the sufferings of civilians.” Nowhere 
in this statement does Pius condemn the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany 
against the Jews. (Cromwell, 290) The American envoy, Harold Tittmann even 
said that he, “called attention to the opinion that the failure of the Holy See to 
protest publicly against Nazi atrocities is endangering its moral prestige and 
undermining faith both in the Chruch and in the Holy Father himself.”
(Friedlander, 118) The pope’s intransigence was now being perceived as a fatal 
blow to the papacy’s prestige.
While the papacy continued its silence, one significant report revealed 
convincing evidence of the Papacy’s denial of the events that were occurring.
Kurt Gerstein, a committed Protestant who singed on with the Waffen SS to 
discover the cover-up of Nazi atrocities, was turned away by the Papal Nuncio 
in Berlin. After this failed attempt, Gerstein gave the report to a Dr. Winter, who
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then handed it off to the Pope’s good friend, Bishop von Preysing of Berlin. It was 
then sent to the Vatican. Meanwhile, two German Catholic spies, Dr. Hans Globke 
and Dr. Josef Muller, handed over further evidence about the Jews to German 
bishops. (Zuccotti, 108) In these reports, most specifically Gerstein’s, they provided 
first hand accounts of mass executions of Jews in gas chambers. How could the 
Papacy believe the accounts of gassings by a Waffen S.S. officer, let alone from two 
German Catholic spies? (Friedlander, 129) The Vatican immediately dismissed the 
fallacious accounts; it was becoming apparent that the Vatican felt no sympathy for 
the Jewish people. (Phayer, 46)
What can be said for Pius XII’s reluctance to issue a formal statement 
denouncing the Holocaust? First, we must look briefly into Pius XU’s past to see 
why he acted the way he did. During the 1920s and 30s, Pius XII commanded two 
of the most important diplomatic posts the Vatican had to offer; they were Papal 
Nuncio to Germany and Secretary of State for the Vatican, respectively.
(Mclnerny, 20-21) Pius XII’s correspondences to the Vatican during this time 
indicates his hatred of Jews. He even went so far as to associate the Jewish race 
with Bolshevik ideology. (Goldhagen, 37) As an envoy, Pius XII never attempted to 
sanction the German Catholic Church from issuing anti-Semitic statements. 
(Cromwell, 296) Finally, Pius XII, in 1937, was responsible for writing the 
encyclical Mil brennender Sorge. In this encyclical, the Church formally condemned 
Nazi Germany’s policies. The encyclical reprimanded the Nazis for its intolerance 
towards the Catholic Church, but not one word was uttered on behalf of the Jews. 
What can be inferred from this document is that Pius, while not foreseeing the 
destruction of the Jews, still believed the Jewish race was not worth saving. 
(Goldhagen, 25) How can God’s human representative on Earth belittle a race 
which had done no injustice to him? Quite simply, Pius’s anti-Semitism was more 
forthright than initially thought. And for that reason, his pre-Papal background 
laid the groundwork for some of the larger mistakes that he was about to make 
involving the Jewish Holocaust.
Pacelli presides over the signing of the Reich Concordat at the Vatican on 
July 20, 1933.
Page 30The HISTORIES, Vol. 2, No. 1
After Taylor’s failed mission and the dismissal of Gerstein's report, Pius XII’s 
concern now laid with Rome’s security. Osborne, the British envoy, wrote in his diary 
in December 1942 that he was utterly disgusted by the Pope’s concern for Rome, 
when so many Jews were being slaughtered. Pius XII hoped the Allies would not 
bomb Rome, but if they did, “the pope would protest publicly.” (Phayer, 62-3) Pius 
never responded in such a manner about the Jews. At the same time, Jewish 
organizations from around the globe lobbied the Vatican to save its people. Montini, 
the Secretary of State for the Vatican, informed these groups that the Vatican “was 
doing all that it could.” (Cromwell, 291) Yet these statements flew in the face of 
reality.
Before 1942 ended, one last attempt was made by Osborne to get the Pope 
to denounce the killings. He asked the Pope to condemn the mass murders of 
Jews in his Christmas Eve address to the world. Domenic Tardini, the pope’s 
intermediary, told Osborne that “the Pope could not take sides.” The Allies 
resorted to their last plan of action. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 
Union decided to issue a statement denouncing the extermination of the Jews.
The Pope was asked to sign. Even now, the Pope was afraid he might betray the 
neutrality he believed in. (Chadwick, 217)
Pacelli broadcasts to the world with Giovanni Mantini, the future Paul 
VI, at his left shoulder. His 1942 Christmas Eve broadcast was perceived 
as a weak and hallow statement regarding the Nazi Final Solution.
The Pope’s Christmas Eve address is the only legitimate statement His 
Holiness made condemning war atrocities. It is obvious that his objective was 
to keep the statement as vague as possible for fear he might be portrayed as taking 
sides. In the address, Pius says that, “the hundreds of thousands who, through 
no fault of their own, only because of their nationality and descent, are condemned 
to death.” (Mclnemy, 95) In this twenty-six page statement, only twenty-seven 
words actually make reference to the Holocaust. Yet in those twenty-seven words,
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not one directly refers to the Jews. In an interview with Harold Tittmann, the 
American envoy to the Vatican, he says Pius, “thought it was plain to everyone that 
he was referring to the ... Jews ... when he declared that hundreds of thousands of 
persons had been killed ... sometimes because of their race or nationality.”
Yet later on Tittmann admitted he was still confused by the vagueness of the 
statement. (Friedlander, 133-34) In early 1943, Pius XII wrote to Bishop Preysing in 
Berlin informing him that his message was clear, concise, and to the point. In reality, 
his words failed to instruct the world about the Holocaust. And for that matter, the 
most important group he tried to reach, the Jews, did not view it as a condemnation. 
(Phayer, 49)
Pacelli tries to calm the Italian crowds during the bombing of Rome,
August 13, 1943.
In July 1943, the Allies began their assault up the Italian peninsula. Rome 
was now under attack and there was little Pius could do. Mussolini’s government 
had fallen from power, and Italy reverted back to a constitutional monarchy. 
(Friedlander, 183) On September 11, German forces occupied the city and declared 
martial law. Reports were coming in from across Italy that Italian Jews were being 
deported to camps. (Zuccotti, 150) During this crisis, Pius was more or less 
responsible for Rome’s inhabitants and its Jewish community. (Cromwell, 299)
The Jewish community in Rome, however, could not depend on the Pope’s 
protection. Instead, the Germans intended to deport all the Jews in Rome. S.S. 
Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Kappler, chief of the German security police in Rome, 
was responsible for carrying out these orders. On September 26, however, Kappler 
asked to meet with Rome’s Jewish leaders for an important meeting. Dante 
Almansi (president of Union of Italian Jewish Communities) and Ugo Foa (president 
of the Jewish Community in Rome) were given an ultimatum. Kappler was willing 
to broker a deal that gave the Jews their lives; the Jews, however, had to hand over
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all their gold possessions for the sake of the German war effort. (Zuccotti, 153)
This seemed to solve the Jews’ problem, but they still had to muster 50 kilograms 
of gold. As word spread, Jews from across the city brought their gold to Rome’s 
synagogue on the banks of the Tiber. (Cromwell, 301) A great debate has ensued as 
to Pius’s role throughout this episode. Defenders of Pius XII have said that he was 
so disturbed by the German demand that he offered a gift of fifty kilograms of gold. 
(Mclnerny, 116) This, however, is a lie. It was meant to be a loan and nothing more. 
For that reason, it gave the Jewish community in Rome a sense of security from the 
Pope that had never existed. The community continued to believe that the fifty 
kilograms and the Pope’s assurances would save them from deportation.
(Zuccotti, 154)
The Germans, however, also lied about the safety of the Jews in Rome. After 
the Jews had delivered the gold on September 28, the Germans entered the Jewish 
officials* offices in Rome. They proceeded to steal 2 million lire as well as the names 
and addresses of the Jewish community of Rome. (Zuccotti, 155) Unfortunately, 
the Jews would be in for a greater shock on October 16. Adolf Eichmann, chief 
of the Gestapo forces in Rome, ordered that the Jews of Rome be rounded up.
Under the command of SS officer Theodor Dannecker, the 365 S.S. and the Waffen 
S.S. entered the Jewish ghetto. (Cromwell, 303) By 2:00 P.M., over 1,200 Jews 
had been detained and sent to the Italian Military College, a little less than a half a 
mile away from the Vatican. (Zuccotti, 155) Pius was immediately informed of the 
roundup by Principessa Enza Pignatelli-Aragona, who ran to the Vatican to inform 
the Pope. The Pope instantly contacted the German ambassador to the Holy See,
Ernst von Weizsacker. Weizsacker immediately went to meet with Secretary of 
State Maglione about the roundups. At this meeting, Maglione explicitly asked 
the German ambassador to take every measure necessary to stop the roundups.
But then Weiszacker asked Maglione, “What would the Holy See do if the events 
continued?” Maglione replied, “the Holy See would not want to be put into the 
necessity of uttering a word of disapproval.” In other words, Maglione believed 
the Germans should handle the roundups and allow the Vatican to remain silent 
on the issue. (Cromwell, 305)
However, the German diplomatic staff in Rome found the “resettlement” 
of the Jews of Rome distasteful. The German ambassador to Italy, Eitel Friedrich 
Mollhausen, decided that they needed to prevent the roundups. They decided to 
write a letter to the German occupying forces in Rome through the hand of Bishop 
Hudal, rector of the Collegia del Anima. In this letter, Hudal wrote that the Vatican 
requested that the Germans discontinue the roundup of Jews. The interesting 
thing is that the Vatican never informed Hudal to do such a thing.
(Phayer, 99-100) It was sent that evening of October 16 at 11:30. (Cromwell, 306)
As a last resort, Weizsacker also wrote a letter to the Foreign Office in Berlin,
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which stated that, “the Curia is dumbfounded, particularly as the action took 
place under the very windows of the pope, as it were.” Weiszacker was trying to 
convince the ministry that the Vatican would protest the further roundup of Jews. 
Lastly, he requested that the Jews be kept to work in Italy. His pleas went 
unheeded. (Zuccotti, 163)
By Monday, October 18, 1943, the deportations had already taken place. The 
trains left Rome and headed out to the Apennine mountains, where frigid temperatures 
swarmed the train cars. The Jews were treated horribly, receiving little food or water. 
While this went on, the Vatican was updated frequently about the Jewish prisoners.
As the Jews were led to their deaths, Pius’s concern now rested with the fear of an 
eventual Communist takeover in Rome. (Phayer, 101) In Pius’s opinion, the 
Germans should make a concerted effort to prevent the Communists from tearing 
Rome apart. Pius conveyed his feelings about the Germans to the American and 
British envoys. To Harold Tittman, Pius said, “Germans had respected the Vatican 
City and the Holy See’s property in Rome. When speaking to Osborne, the British 
envoy, Pius thanked the German army for assuring the neutrality of the Vatican.
In the end, Pius overshadowed the plight of the Jews with his concern for the 
security of Rome. Five days after the Jews left Rome, 1,060 of Rome’s Jews were 
gassed at Auschwitz. Some 149 men and 47 were forced into servile labor. At the 
war’s end, only 15 of Rome’s Jews had survived. In later roundups, another 1,084 
would be sent to Auschwitz and Italian concentration camps, where few managed 
to escape with their lives. (Cromwell, 309-310)
On October 25-26, 1943, an article in L ’Osservator Romano, otherwise 
known as the “Voice of the Holy See” recognized Pius XII for his “paternal charity 
... it might be said, ever more active; it knows neither boundaries nor nationality, 
neither religion nor race.” (Friedlander, 208) These words did not convey the 
feelings, however, of many of the diplomatic envoys to the Vatican. Osborne, the 
British envoy, believed the Pope had failed to take a “strong line.” Likewise, the 
Jesuit rescuer of Jews, Tacchi-Venturri, despised the Vatican for its failure to 
approach the deportations in a more open and candid light. (Phayer, 101-102)
How could the Holy Pontiff, with his detractors so close to him, not feel shame 
for his cowardly acts? As we are about to find out, Pius’s reluctance to save 
hundreds of innocent Jews would come back to haunt him again in 1944.
By March 1944, the Final Solution had taken millions of Jewish lives.
The Germans continued to find pockets of Jewish populations that still needed 
to be exterminated, such as the 670,000 Hungarian Jews. Eichmann, who had 
been put in charge of rounding up the Italian Jews, now began his roundups in 
Hungary. (Zuccotti, 293) The papal nuncio to Hungary, Angelo Rotta, made an 
appeal on behalf of the Hungarian Jews to the newly appointed Hungarian 
ministry. Cromwell points out that no Vatican representative had officially
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lobbied a protest during the war until now. (Cromwell, 325) Pius was receiving 
pressure from the Allied Powers to denounce the deportation of Hungarian Jews.
Pius, however, only protested to the Hungarian dictator, Miklos Horthy, on June 25. 
Horthy finally complied with the Pontiffs protest on July 9, at which point Hungary 
had already been emptied of its Jewish population. If Pius XII had taken notice earlier, 
he may have been able to save 437,000 Jewish victims from deportation and execution. 
Instead, His Holiness only conformed to Ally pressure after he had been informed 
that the Germans were losing the war. Pius, was more or less, waiting on the 
sidelines to see which side he could align himself with. By becoming a political 
pawn, he neglected the dire circumstances the Hungarian Jews had been placed in. 
(Goldhagen, 24)
What can be said for Pope Pius XII and his lack of compassion for the 
Jews of Europe? Based on the facts gathered, it is hard to refute the true nature of 
Pius XII’s anti-Semitic tendencies. His inability to act as an honest arbiter on 
behalf of all European Jews resulted in the loss of many innocent lives. How can 
any God-loving Catholic believe their Holy Father to be so dishonest? As any 
Catholic or good hearted religious person should know, we all sin. But some in the 
Catholic faith tend to take the dogma of papal infallibility too far. Garry Wills points 
out, “Catholics have fallen out of the healthy old habit of reminding each other 
how sinful popes can be. Authoritative as a Pope may be by his office, he is not 
impeccable as a man - he can sin, as can all humans.” (Wills, 1) Pope Pius XII 
was a sinful pope. All popes have sinned. But does that make Pius XII any less 
responsible for the deaths of those Jewish victims of the Holocaust, especially those 
that were “under his very windows?” Sadly, there will be those that say Pius did 
more than his part in saving Jewish lives, while his detractors will continue to 
vilify the true nature of his actions. In the end, however, Pius XII must not answer 
to us, but to the one true God he was meant to represent here on Earth.
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